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BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO U.S. INVESTMENT
IN VIETNAM’S REAL ESTATE MARKET
Stephanie L. Strike†
Abstract: Despite great progress in Vietnam’s general investment environment,
barriers exist which impede U.S. investment in Vietnam’s real estate market. While
Vietnam remains a socialist country, drastic liberalization of its market structure and
investment laws have made Vietnam a more attractive environment for most U.S.
investors. However, barriers remain for U.S. investors seeking to invest in Vietnam’s
real estate, specifically property developers wishing to build tourism complexes. These
barriers include weak transportation infrastructure, financial and humanitarian issues
posed by site clearance, and lack of accountability in the real estate licensing system. To
facilitate U.S. investment in Vietnam’s real estate, Vietnam should strategically target
transportation infrastructure projects and improve infrastructure financing schemes;
decrease the issues posed by site clearance through increased government participation;
and increase accountability in its licensing system by reconciling the conflicting
ideologies of the local and national governments and by reducing corruption. With
implementation of such changes, Vietnam may attract greater U.S. investment in its real
estate market.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Vietnam’s Quang Ninh province, tourism has boomed.1 In 2002 the
number of tourists in Quang Ninh increased thirty-six percent over 2001,2
and another ten percent from 2002 to 2003.3 One million of these tourists
were foreigners,4 drawn to the beautiful landscape and convenient location
close to the Vietnam-China border.5 Capitalizing on this tourism boom,
Hong Kong investors have pledged to invest US$36 million to build a resort,
including a five-star hotel, eighteen-hole golf course, and other tourism
oriented facilities, in the region.6
Early in Vietnam’s socialist history, the United States and its investors
refused to economically deal with Vietnam. Over the past twenty years,
reforms to Vietnam’s investment laws created an environment generally
attractive to U.S. investors. Today, Vietnam’s overall economy is seeing
†

The author would like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor.
See Vietnam-Korean JV Invests $7.3MLN in Building in Ha Long City, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS,
Jan. 28, 2005.
2
Quang Ninh Receives 2.3MLN Visitors in 2002, Up 36% On-Year [sic], VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS,
Dec. 27, 2002.
3
Hong Kong Firm to Build $36MLN Resort in Northern Vietnam, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, Dec.
21, 2004.
4
Mostly from China, Europe, and ASEAN countries. Id.
5
See id.
6
Id.
1
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great success with healthy U.S. investment. With implementation of recent
reforms, including the new Common Investment Law, largely formulated
with the intent to satisfy the United States’ trade interests, U.S. investment in
Vietnam’s general investment market may increase further.
However, many U.S. investors believe that barriers remain which
impede their participation in Vietnam’s real estate market. Much of Vietnam
is plagued by weak transportation infrastructure, creating difficulties for
tourists attempting to travel from one attraction to the next.7 Property
developers avoid investing in areas where strong infrastructure is not
available to facilitate their projects.8 The financial9 and humanitarian issues
that investors face from site clearance pose another barrier to U.S.
investment. Lack of undeveloped land means that many development sites
are already occupied and must undergo site clearance, which requires
relocating and compensating present occupants prior to construction.10 Site
clearance can be costly both from potential development delays and
compensation to occupants. A third major obstacle is the lack of
accountability in Vietnam’s licensing scheme.11 Vietnam’s national licensing
scheme, which supports foreign investment, is often undermined by its
implementation at the local level.12 Additionally, corruption pervades the
government authorities' administration of Vietnam’s real estate licenses.13
While these barriers all may impede U.S. investment in Vietnam’s real
estate, reforms can be made to create a more appealing environment.
Vietnam should target the development of transportation infrastructure,
create successful financing schemes, alleviate the difficulties associated with
site clearance through increased government involvement, and resolve the
lack of accountability in its real estate licensing system posed by disparate
governmental goals and corruption.
Part II of this Comment will briefly outline Vietnam’s general
investment environment, past and present. Part III will analyze the barriers
which U.S. investors believe remain to investment in Vietnam’s real estate

7

See Vietnam Still Unattractive to French Tourists, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, May 18, 2005.
See Thien Nhan, Sound Infrastructure Vital to Developing Thu Thiem, THE SAIGON TIMES DAILY,
Apr. 6, 2000.
9
See VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, Business, Joint Donor Report to the Vietnam
Consultative Group Meeting, Dec. 6-7, 2005, at 82.
10
Id.; see also HCM City Short of Land for Investors, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, Mar. 3, 2004 (Ho Chi
Minh City is likely to face a shortage of land for investors in the near future).
11
See infra Part III.C.
12
See Luke Aloysius McGrath, Vietnam’s Struggle to Balance Sovereignty, Centralization, and
Foreign Investment Under Doi Moi, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2095, 2098-99, 2108 (1995).
13
See Vietnam: Reasons for Bullishness, GLOBAL NEWS FUND, Dec. 19, 2005, at 9(1) v. 11.
8
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market. Part IV presents suggestions for how Vietnam may effectively break
down these barriers.
II.

VIETNAM’S GENERAL INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT SUPPORTS U.S.
INVESTMENT

Vietnam’s real estate investment environment is impacted, in no small
way, by the overall investment environment in Vietnam. While Vietnam
remains a socialist country, drastic liberalization of its market structure and
investment laws have made Vietnam a more attractive environment for many
U.S. investors.14 Vietnam initiated a drastic economic restructuring in 1987,
largely in order to attract foreign investors.15 In recent years, Vietnam’s
efforts intensified leading to reforms, such as the new Common Investment
Law, which make Vietnam’s investment environment even more attractive to
U.S. investors.16 Today, Vietnam’s economy is flourishing17 with the support
of foreign investment in many economic sectors.18
A.

Historically, Vietnam Provided
Unattractive to U.S. Investors

an

Investment

Environment

Historically, U.S. investors avoided any type of investment in
Vietnam. Following the United States’ involvement in Vietnam from 19611975,19 its economic relations with Vietnam were strained. Vietnam
reunified into a single country in 1976,20 adopting socialism, a highly
invasive economic scheme under which the State, not the market, controls
the economy.21 With Vietnam’s adoption of socialism, the United States
imposed economic isolation on Vietnam22 as a means to pressure economic
reform.23 In order to preserve good relations with the United States, other
14

See David Dollar & Borje Ljunggren, Vietnam, in GOING GLOBAL: TRANSITION FROM PLAN TO
MARKET IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 439, 448 (Padma Desai, ed., 1997).
15
See Magali Matarazzi, Selecting a Corporate Form: Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam’s Oil
and Gas Industry under the 1995 Land Law, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 364, 367 (1999); Laura A.
Malinasky, Rebuilding With Broken Tools: Build-Operate-Transfer Law in Vietnam, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 438, 438 (1996).
16
See New Laws Help Accelerate Vietnam’s Accession to WTO, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Jan. 24,
2006.
17
See Vietnam Targets US$6BLN in FDI in 2006, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 9, 2006.
18
See Vietnam Attracts US$1.3BLN in FDI in Two Months, ASIA PULSE, Feb. 27, 2006.
19
United States State Department, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note:
Vietnam (2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
20
Malinasky, supra note 15, at 440.
21
Geoffrey Murray, Vietnam: Dawn of A New Market 21 (1997).
22
Pamela L. Polevoy, Privatization In Vietnam: The Next Step in Vietnam’s Economic Transition
From a Nonmarket to Market Economy, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 887, 902 (1998).
23
McGrath, supra note 12, at 2108-09.
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industrialized nations followed suit, leading to Vietnam’s economic isolation
from nearly the entire international community.24
The United States’ isolation tactic proved effective, forcing Vietnam’s
government to implement quasi-market economic reforms by the mid1980s.25 A particularly significant piece of reform was the Foreign
Investment Law (“FIL”), passed in 1987.26 The FIL sought to infuse foreign
investment dollars27 into Vietnam’s desperately struggling domestic
market.28 The FIL proved remarkably successful,29 with foreign investors
taking advantage of the new investment opportunities in Vietnam’s
increasingly open market.30 By the mid-1990s, Foreign Direct Investment
(“FDI”) accounted for more than one third of Vietnam’s Gross Domestic
Product (“GDP”).31
Following the FIL, the United States moved closer toward
establishing normal economic relations with Vietnam.32 Significant U.S.
investment in Vietnam rapidly ensued.33 The United States now constitutes a
major source of foreign investment in Vietnam.34 Many experts expect the
interest of U.S. investors to continue to grow as the Bilateral Trade
Agreement (“BTA”) with the United States becomes fully implemented35
and Vietnam accedes to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).36

24

With the exception of the communist nations of Eastern Europe. See Polevoy, supra note 22, at

902.
25
See Norman Brown IV, The Long Road to Reform: An Analysis of Foreign Investment Reform in
Vietnam, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 97, 97 (2002).
26
Matarazzi, supra note 15, at 367; Malinasky, supra note 15, at 438. Further reforms to the FIL
occurred in 2000 that allowed foreign investors to mortgage their land-use rights. Brown IV, supra note 25,
at 100.
27
Throughout this Comment, foreign investment refers to foreign direct investment (“FDI”). FDI is
the reinvesting of foreign profits into a foreign nation’s economy. FDI may aid developing economies by
increasing capital available for investment. Brown IV, supra note 25, at 99.
28
See id. at 97.
29
From 1988-1993, Vietnam’s GDP growth was higher than at any period since reunification.
DOLLAR & LJUNGGREN, supra note 14, at 448; contra Goodnight, Vietnam, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2000
(circa 2000, foreign investment had fallen below 1992 levels).
30
See DOLLAR & LJUNGGREN, supra note 14, at 448.
31
Goodnight, Vietnam, supra note 29.
32
McGrath, supra note 12, at 2109.
33
See Polevoy, supra note 22, at 910.
34
See McGrath, supra note 12, at 2099. The United States was Vietnam’s largest investor in 2004.
Report Shows US to be Largest Investor in Vietnam in 2004, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Feb. 24, 2006.
35
After the BTA was initially implemented, Vietnam increased exports to the United States by 450%
over one year. U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement is a Stepping Stone Toward the WTO, VIETNAM NEWS, Dec.
15, 2004, http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/2004-12/14/Stories/17.htm (interview with Steve Parker,
director of the STAR-Viet Nam project).
36
See id.; Thai Thanh, Foreign Funds Target Ambitious, SAIGON TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 20, 2006;
NZ Concludes WTO Negotiations With Vietnam, NEW ZEALAND PRESS ASSOCIATION, Jan. 25, 2006.
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Recent reforms to Vietnam’s investment laws resulted from efforts to
implement the BTA and gain accession into the WTO.37 Since the signing of
the BTA in 2000, Vietnam has modernized its legal and judicial systems,
improved the transparency of its legislative and administrative procedures,
and enhanced its dispute resolution process.38 Successful implementation of
the BTA is considered a stepping stone to Vietnam’s accession to the WTO
since much of the BTA is built upon WTO principles.39
B.

Vietnam’s General Investment Environment Today Is Conducive to
U.S. Investment

After years of economic reform, Vietnam’s investment environment is
now conducive to general investment from the United States. In 2005,
Vietnam’s economy was stronger than it had been in nearly a decade, and
forecasts for 2006 indicate that Vietnam’s economic strength will continue
into the future. Bright projections are further supported by the passage of
the Common Investment Law,40 which successfully alleviates many former
investment concerns of U.S. investors.41
1.

Vietnam’s General Investment Environment Appears Strong

Vietnam’s economy is flourishing.42 In 2005, Vietnam’s economy
experienced healthy growth in its GDP, 43 with year-on-year growth of thirty
percent.44 FDI inflows45 reached an eight-year high,46 contributing fifteen
percent of the GDP.47 Vietnam’s GDP growth is now the second fastest in
Asia.48

37

U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement is a Stepping Stone Toward the WTO, supra note 35.
Id.
39
See id.
40
Law 59-2005-QH11 on Investment.
41
New Laws Help Accelerate Vietnam’s Accession to WTO, supra note 16.
42
Vietnam Economic Fruits From International Integration, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Jan. 26, 2006
(FDI has become one of the most important capital sources for the country’s development, helping speed
up the restructuring of its economy towards industrialization and modernization).
43
Amy Kazmin, Rapid Vietnam Growth ‘Likely to Continue,’ FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at 10.
44
Vietnam Targets US$6BLN in FDI in 2006, supra note 17.
45
Most foreign investment in Vietnam has been in the manufacturing and tourism arenas from
Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea. See Taiwan Implements 1,408 Projects in Vietnam, ASIA
PULSE, Jan. 9, 2006.
46
Almost US$4 billion of 2005 FDI went to fund 771 newly-licensed FDI projects. Vietnam Targets
US$6BLN in FDI in 2006, supra note 17.
47
FDI Firms Honoured at VN Forinvest, VIETNAMNET, Nov. 3, 2005, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/
biz/2005/11/507536.
48
Behind China. NZ Concludes WTO Negotiations With Vietnam, supra note 36.
38
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Forecasts for 2006 indicate that Vietnam’s investment environment
will remain strong. According to the Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and
Investment, Vietnam will yield more than US$6 billion in FDI in 2006,49 a
twenty-nine percent increase over 2005.50 FDI investment51 was up twelve
percent in January 2006 against the same period in 2005.52 The United
States is one of the biggest investors, with most capital going into real
estate.53
Another reason to believe that Vietnam will continue to see strong
FDI is that developed nations are trying to diversify their investment risks
beyond China to countries such as Vietnam.54 Many of Vietnam’s new
investors have moved their operations from China due to concerns about
economic and political uncertainty in that country.55 As a result, foreign
investment in Vietnam has increased, with FDI dollars rising to the level of
popular investment destinations such as India.56
Many in the international community are encouraged by these positive
economic forecasts. The World Bank Country Director for Vietnam, Klaus
Rohland, has stated that in the next five years, Vietnam will shift from lowincome to middle-income.57 Vietnam hopes to shed its poor-country status
by 2010.58
2.

Vietnam’s New Common Investment Law Encourages U.S. Investment

Vietnam’s new Common Investment Law, which will come into effect
in July 2006,59 marks a major step toward addressing key concerns of U.S.
investors.60 The Common Investment Law has been described as an
“extremely important bill for the investment environment in Vietnam, which
has a direct and immediate impact on all investors and all investment
49

Vietnam Targets US$6BLN in FDI in 2006, supra note 17.
New capital expected to come mostly from northeastern Asian countries, especially Japan.
Foreign Investment to Rise with New Law, ASEM CONNECT, Dec. 23, 2005,
http://www.asemconnectvietnam.gov.vn/detail.aspx?id=7230 .
51
South Korea, Japan and Taiwan were the biggest investors, especially in the real estate market.
Vietnam Attracts US$444 MLN FDI In Jan., ASIA PULSE NEWS, Jan. 25, 2006.
52
Id.
53
Vietnam Attracts US$1.3BLN in FDI in Two Months, supra note 18.
54
Investors Look Beyond China, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006; see also George Wehrfritz,
Vietnam Revs Up, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Nov. 28, 2005.
55
Wehrfritz, supra note 54.
56
Id.
57
Rethinking the Five-year-plan, VIETNAMNET, Oct. 14, 2005, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/news/
2005/10/500094.
58
Id.
59
New Laws Help Accelerate Vietnam’s Accession to WTO, supra note 16.
60
Id.
50

SEPTEMBER 2006

VIETNAM’S REAL ESTATE MARKET

863

activities in the economy.”61 Under the new law, investors’ rights are
protected by an article prohibiting the government from forcing investors
into certain market-unfriendly activities.62 This provision is a shift from the
past, when government dictates trumped market demands.63 In addition,
Vietnam shifted its policy from one that outlawed anything not explicitly
permitted, to one that permits investment in all sectors, industries, and trades
not prohibited by law.64
The Common Investment Law further benefits investors by
streamlining administrative procedures.65 By reorganizing administrative
procedures to require only a single investment-business license,66 the
business license registration process is expected to be much quicker than in
the past.67 Investors can complete all the necessary paperwork online,
confirmed by electronic mail, without going to a registration body.68
Vietnam’s drastic economic and investment reforms have generally
made Vietnam a more attractive environment for U.S. investors.69 Recent
reform efforts, including the new Common Investment Law, alleviate many
of the former concerns with investment in Vietnam held by potential U.S.
investors.70 The strong investment environment in Vietnam today further
supports foreign investment in many economic sectors.
III.

BARRIERS PERSIST WHICH IMPEDE U.S. INVESTMENT
REAL ESTATE

IN

VIETNAM’S

Despite Vietnam’s improvements to its general investment laws,
barriers persist for U.S. investors seeking to invest in Vietnam’s real estate
market. Property developers interested in developing tourism complexes are
particularly affected by weak transportation infrastructure, issues posed by
61

Investment Law: Unfavourable for [sic] More Favourable?, VIETNAMNET, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/biz/2005/11/508703.
62
Tran Anh Duc & Jesse Lieberman, Laws to Provide Equal Footing for Investors, TALKING LAW,
Dec. 28, 2005, http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/showarticle.php?num=01TAW281205.
63
See generally id. (new law contains “an article prohibiting the Government from forcing investors
into certain market unfriendly activities”).
64
Id.
65
See Vietnam’s Investment Ministry to Give Depts New Licensing Right, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 20,
2006.
66
All Comments on Investment Bill to Be Examined Carefully, VIETNAMNET, Nov. 6, 2005,
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/biz/2005/11/508413.
67
Registration can be completed in seven days. Investment Law: Unfavourable [or] More
Favourable?, supra note 61.
68
See id.
69
See generally McGrath, supra note 12 (discussing Vietnamese legal and institutional reforms). See
also generally Polevoy, supra note 22 (discussing Vietnam’s transition to a market economy).
70
See New Laws Help Accelerate Vietnam’s Accession to WTO, supra note 16.
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site clearance, and a lack of national accountability in the real estate
licensing system.
Many of the problems facing potential real estate investors are
evidenced by Vietnam’s Lam Dong province. Since 2003, Lam Dong has
attracted FDI for tourism services.71 However, the number of real estate
investment projects in the region does not match its potential for
development.72 Under-investment is due to the barriers facing real estate
investors, including inadequate funding for infrastructure development, extra
financial costs from paying local citizens for site clearance, and an overly
cumbersome administrative process.73 Such burdens have dissuaded some
potential investors from investing in the province’s real estate.74
A.

Vietnam’s Weak Transportation Infrastructure Dissuades Many U.S.
Investors from Developing Vietnam’s Real Estate

Weak transportation infrastructure constitutes a significant hurdle for
real estate investors in Vietnam. A recent survey found that about twenty
percent of investment firms view infrastructure provisions as a serious
obstacle to the growth and operation of their business.75 Of particular
concern are transportation infrastructures.76 Many potential investors have
dismissed certain projects due to the high site-preparation costs associated
with the poor state of the roads and bridges.77
The neighboring provinces of Hue and Danang demonstrate how
infrastructure can affect investment in the tourism industry. Both the coastal
provinces of Hue and Danang possess significant natural assets to attract
tourism.78 However, the two differ greatly in the availability of land with
suitable infrastructure.79 Danang provides much better access to roads.80 In
2003, Danang spent about sixty percent more per capita than Hue on large

71

See Vietnam Lam Dong Strives to Improve Investment Environment, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Jan.

9, 2006.
72

Id.
See id.
Id.
75
See VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 98.
76
See id. at 99; Mai Anh, Low Labour Costs Lure Korean Firms, VIETNAM INV. REV., Jan. 2, 2006,
at 7(1) (Korean investors face difficulties with the weaknesses of Vietnam’s infrastructure, including road
systems and electricity supply).
77
Thien Nhan, supra note 8.
78
VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 140.
79
See id.. at 141.
80
Id. at 140.
73
74
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investment projects.81 As a result, Danang has attracted more FDI82 and “is
one of the most popular tourist destinations in Central Vietnam.”83
Strong transportation infrastructure is particularly important to
potential investors in tourism-friendly real estate. Vietnam’s most attractive
tourism destinations are spread widely across the country, making accessible
transportation to and from these destinations a key component of successful
tourism ventures in Vietnam.84
However, Vietnam’s transportation
infrastructure has been particularly slow to improve. 85 For example, after
twenty years of reform, Vietnam has yet to build a national expressway
consistent with international standards.86
Vietnam’s national government has made some improvements to its
transportation infrastructure.87 For instance, Vietnam’s Prime Minister has
approved a project to build an inner-city railway route in Ho Chi Minh
City.88 The Prime Minister also approved a project to build an expressway89
in Quang Ninh to enhance the province’s tourism industry.90
Vietnam is also working to improve its aviation sector. It hopes to
become the fourth largest aviation market in the region by 2025.91
Improvements chiefly include upgrades to airport facilities and ground
services.92 The aviation sector has increased its passenger transport capacity
from little more than 1 million in 1990 to 13 million in 2005.93
Problems in Vietnam’s infrastructure remain, however, and the
resources to rectify them are scarce. Vietnam has attempted to locate
resources for infrastructure projects in a variety of ways, including issuance
of infrastructure bonds, partnerships with the private sector, and dependence
on local governments.94 Although some of these attempts have produced
success, these methods are not as effective as they could be. The
81
82

Id. at 141.
Accumulated investment by foreign companies is three times higher in Danang than in Hue. Id. at

141.
83

Tien Dat, Discounts to Attract Customers, SAIGON TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 20, 2006.
See Vietnam Still Unattractive to French Tourists, supra note 7.
85
Thai Thanh, Foreign Funds Target Ambitious, SAIGON TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 20, 2006.
86
Id.
87
See FDI Flows Into Service Sector, VIETNAMNET, Nov. 7, 2005, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/
biz/2005/11/508833; VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 98.
88
Vietnam PM Approves US$700 MLN Ho Chi Minh City Railway PJT, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 19, 2006.
89
Mong Duong-Mong Cai Highway. PM Gives Green Light To Mong Duong-Mong Cai
Expressway, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, Apr. 27, 2005.
90
Id.
91
Asia Aviation, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 6, 2006.
92
Id.
93
Vietnam’s Aviation Sector to Make Intensive Investment in Infrastructure, THAI PRESS REPORTS,
Jan. 19, 2006.
94
VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 101.
84
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effectiveness of infrastructure bonds is undermined by competition and
implementation difficulties. Private participation has been limited by the
perceived lack of profitability of infrastructure projects. Generally, the
largest responsibility for rural transport infrastructure lies at the local level,95
and efforts to encourage local governments to fill in the gaps are impeded by
the lack of national government oversight.
Vietnam’s government has issued infrastructure bonds for specific
projects; however, it has found it difficult to raise capital this way.96 Several
reasons for this difficulty have been suggested. The first reason relates to
the relatively low interest rate of the bonds compared to other investments.97
The second is that local governments, such as those in Ho Chi Minh City
and Hanoi, are creating competition by also offering infrastructure bonds.98
Additionally, the federal bonds already face mobilization and disbursement
problems; only three fourths of planned disbursements were expected to
occur by the end of 2005.99 Disbursement delays are blamed on complex
investment procedures, site clearance, and poor supervision.100
Another way that Vietnam should generate funds for infrastructure
improvement is through privatization.101 Currently, private participation in
the transportation sector is quite limited. With few exceptions102 all toll
roads currently operational in Vietnam are owned and managed by the
national and local governments.103 Complex land acquisition procedures and
difficulty in recovering costs have deterred private investors from
developing new toll roads.104
The national government’s difficulty in generating funds for
infrastructure has led it to encourage local provinces to take greater
responsibility for financing infrastructure.105 In response, thirteen provinces
have already established Local Development Investment Funds

95
See THE WORLD BANK, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR
74.1 Million to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for a Third Rural Transport Project, Jan. 25, 2006, at 19.
96
Taking Stock: An Update on Vietnam’s Economic Developments and Reforms by the World Bank
in Vietnam, Consultative Group Meeting for Vietnam, Dec. 6-7, 2005, at 10 [hereinafter Taking Stock].
97
Id.
98
Id. at 11.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
See generally VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 103-04 (transportation,
ports and railways earn enough revenue to cover their operating expenses).
102
In Quang Linh, a private sector company built segments of road in exchange for LUCs along the
road corridor, a model which has been replicated in other locations. Id. at 103.
103
See id.
104
Id.
105
Taking Stock, supra note 96, at 31.
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(“LDIFs”).106 LDIFs are intended to support private participation in
infrastructure development.107 Support takes various forms, including direct
financing of projects,108 but thus far, lending constitutes the bulk of LDIF
activities.109
Some provinces have already succeeded in raising funds for
infrastructure development projects. In 2002, the Quang Ninh province, one
of the most popular tourist destinations in northern Vietnam,110 spent
US$54.96 million to upgrade infrastructure in its tourism sites.111 In Thu
Thiem, additional infrastructure is scheduled to be built in conjunction with
the development of a new urban center.112 These developments are
estimated to require at least US$600 million over the first ten years113 and
will include a subway line and station, bus and waterbus services, and five
bridges to link the region’s districts.114
The inadequacy of national regulations pertaining to the
implementation of LDIFs at the local level has stunted private participation
in infrastructure development. In theory, LDIFs allow local governments to
enter into infrastructure contracts with the private sector.115 However, there
are no national regulations that govern the operation and functions of
LDIFs,116 leaving provincial governments with significant discretion over
LDIF operations.117 This allows local governments to disregard federal
efforts to encourage private participation. As a result, direct participation of
the private sector in infrastructure development remains minimal.118
B.

U.S. Real Estate Investors Face Excessive Financial Risks from Site
Clearance

U.S. real estate investors claim that they are discouraged from
investing in Vietnam’s tourism-friendly real estate due to the excessive
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Id.
VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 102.
Id.
Hong Kong Firm to Build $36MLN Resort in Northern Vietnam, supra note 3.
Quang Ninh Receives 2.3MLN Visitors in 2002, Up 36% On-Year, supra note 2.
Vietnam City’s new Urban Center May Cost 10 Billion USD, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Mar. 8, 2006.
Nguyen Hong, City to Prove Thu Thiem Doubters Wrong, VIETNAM INV. REV., June 20, 2005, at

19.
114

US Firm Designs Urban Area for Ho Chi Minh City, ASIA PULSE, Nov. 5, 2004.
VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 103.
116
Id. at 102.
117
See id. at 103 (“LDIFs offer an operational and legal structure for provincial governments to focus
on infrastructure . . . [b]ut their governance and transparency need to be strengthened”).
118
Id. at 102.
115

868

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 3

financial risks they face from site clearance.119 Unoccupied land available
for development is scarce, particularly in the most populous areas, such as
Ho Chi Minh City.120 Thus, new developments often require site clearance
and compensation for the current occupants.121 Site clearance often results
in costly delays to development. 122 As a result, businesses sometimes pay
substantial unofficial fees to decrease the length, and thus the cost, of
delays.123 Prior to reforms, many investors were unable to implement
projects due to the difficulties with site clearance.124 According to a survey
of foreign investors in the services sector, access to land is the most
important constraint to investment in Vietnam, with twenty-eight percent
reporting it to be a severe or major constraint.125
Lack of access to land is of particular concern to real estate investors
in the tourism industry. According to many commentators, Vietnam is in
need of more luxury accommodations.126 The demand for hotel rooms in
large cities, such as Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, has been very high.127 In
Hanoi several luxury hotels on occasion have had to turn away fifty percent
of potential reservations due to lack of available rooms.128 However, in the
larger cities the supply of available land to develop new hotels is too small
to meet demand.129 Therefore, investors must clear sites in the city or build
in the countryside.130
Reforms to Vietnam’s site clearance regulations have somewhat eased
the burden that investors face. Since 2004, regulations require provincial
governments to provide housing in resettlement zones for households whose
land has been recovered by the state.131 Moreover, foreign investors are no

119

VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 45, 55.
See HCM City Short of Land For Investors, supra note 10; see VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2006, supra note 9.
121
See VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 81-82.
122
USAID, Land Law Reform in Vietnam 2004: A Business Perspective 9 (2004).
123
Id.
124
PHILLIPS FOX, VIETNAM LEGAL UPDATE, 12 (2001), available at http://www.vietnamlaws.com/
vlu/nov_2001.pdf.
125
VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 45, 55.
126
See Tourism: Vietnam Could Double Tourism Targets, VIETNAM NEW BRIEFS, Apr. 4, 2005;
Vietnam Still Unattractive to French Tourists, supra note 7.
127
Vietnam Tourism, supra note 120.
128
Id.
129
VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9; see also HCM City Short of Land for
Investors, supra note 10.
130
Vietnam Tourism: Second to None, VIETNAM BUSINESS FORUM, Feb. 20, 2006
http://vibforum.vcci.vn/news_detail.asp?news_id=4326.
131
Few zones have actually been created. VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 83.
120

SEPTEMBER 2006

VIETNAM’S REAL ESTATE MARKET

869

longer required to pay for site clearance.132 Now, investors only pay for
their lease on the land and the provincial government covers all resettlement
and other expenses associated with site clearance.133 If an investor incurs
such expenses, it can deduct them from the cost of the land-use fees applied
for the lease.134
Despite these reforms, site clearance for developments, such as hotels,
often leads to considerable costs and delays for investors.135 For example,
the cost of a major road construction project in Ho Chi Minh City rose from
VND312.3 billion to VND831.6 billion when ninety houses needed to be
cleared to make room for the project.136 Not only did this delay affect the
project itself, but it also affected another project under construction in the
same area.137 In another instance, to build the East-West corridor, Ho Chi
Minh City had to move 7000 households and 360 offices.138 It took eight
years of preparation and site clearance before Ho Chi Minh City could begin
construction.139 Sometimes, by the time construction actually commences
on a project, investors who previously signed land-leasing contracts have
already waited years beyond what they had originally expected in order to
acquire the land.140
Disagreements with affected occupants over site clearance have
resulted in considerable delays as well.141 For example, in 2002, a company
in the Ha Tay province submitted a request to lease 6442 square meters of
pond land behind the company’s head office.142 The appropriate local
authorities approved the company’s application in 2004, after two years of
132

Id. (Previously, foreign investors who wanted to lease land had to compensate affected
households, but many found this old regulation to be unreasonable); Land Clearance Within Limits,
SAIGON TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 18, 2004.
133
VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 83; Land Clearance Within Limits, supra
note 132.
134
VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 83; Land Clearance Within Limits, supra
note 132.
135
See PETER DONOVAN & ADAM MCCARTY, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, VIETNAM’S
INTEGRATION WITH ASEAN: THE IMPACT ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (1997), at 14, available at
http://www.undp.org.vn/projects/vie95015/inter/intrep3.rtf; VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra
note 9, at 82 (site clearance has often lasted years); Land Clearance Within Limits, supra note 132.
136
Song Nguyen, Road Project Moves at Slow Pace, THE SAIGON TIMES DAILY, May 4, 2004.
137
Lack of road access caused delays. Id.
138
Construction on East-West Corridor Begins Late Jan, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEFS, Jan. 31, 2005.
139
Id.
140
HCM City Short of Land for Investors, supra note 10.
141
See, e.g., VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 80 (communities of Chieng
Dong have resisted site clearance vigorously). Disagreements over site clearance have also incited violence.
In 2003, over a dozen Vietnamese attacked a local site clearance office due to a dispute over the
government taking their land. U.S. Department of State, Vietnam: Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices -2003 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27794.htm.
142
VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 82.

870

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 3

consultation and bargaining with the affected households.143 The company
agreed to pay compensation to the homeowners and contribute money in
support of infrastructure building.144 However, shortly after approval, local
residents prevented the company from completing the agreed-upon project
because they were afraid that the new factory would pollute their stream.145
The dispute continued despite several new rounds of negotiations and
assurances by the company that its factory would have a waste filter system
compatible with international standards.146
The resolution of site clearance issues is complicated by humanitarian
issues which often arise regarding the relocation of current land occupants.
Under Vietnam’s socialist system, the national government holds the land in
trust for its citizens.147 While taking land for infrastructure projects can be
considered “in the public interest” under Vietnamese law, lack of
accountability in the land revocation and compensation systems leads to
little guarantee that the public will benefit from such projects.148 Some
projects which result from site clearance may be of some benefit to current
occupants.149 However, many will also cause a severe detriment to
citizens.150 Citizens and government entities, including the National
Assembly, have complained that relocated citizens are not compensated
fairly or in a timely manner.151
The humanitarian concerns posed by site clearance are not necessarily
being addressed by Vietnamese officials.152 In 2003, four people were
sentenced “to jail terms ranging from 24 to 42 months after they
disseminated . . . letters denouncing local land clearance policies.”153 Later
that same year four people were sentenced “to prison terms of 30 to 42
143
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months for inciting fellow farmers to voice complaints over provincial land
use policies.”154
C.

The Lack of Accountability in Vietnam’s Licensing System Undermines
U.S. Investment in Vietnam’s Real Estate

A large barrier to investment in Vietnam’s real estate sector is the lack
of accountability in Vietnam’s real estate licensing scheme. Vietnam’s
national licensing scheme is often undermined by its implementation at the
local level.155 Corruption pervades the government authorities’
administration of Vietnam’s real estate licenses.156 The resultant delays in
the licensing process prove costly to real estate investors.157
In Vietnam, socialist principles dictate that private individuals have no
right to own land.158 Instead, the Vietnamese government acts as a sort of
fiduciary to “the people”159 by exercising its discretion to allocate land-use
rights (“LUR”) to individuals and entities.160 LURs grant individuals and
entities the right to use, transfer, or lease a parcel of land for a specific
period of time.161
The efficacy of national licensing laws is often undermined by
interpretations at the local (provincial) level that are inconsistent with the
national agenda.162
Vietnam’s local authorities exercise “inordinate
163
power.”
LURs are administered at both the national and local level,164
with local governments playing a central role.165 Ultimate control over LUR
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legislation and policy is retained at the national level;166 however, local
authorities167 possess broad discretion to allot land use rights.168 Acting
independently from the national government,169 local authorities have been
known to interpret national laws to further local, as opposed to national,
goals.170 The result is proper real estate titling differing from one province
to the next.171
The attitude of public officials toward businesses, and how they
choose to exercise their discretion as a result, makes an enormous difference
in the provincial investment climate.172 The ability of investors to get access
to land and protection from corruption is largely determined by the attitudes
of local authorities.173 Local licenses can be more or less burdensome,
depending on the inclination of local authorities toward pursuit of the
national government’s goals.174
Local implementation of laws can lead to delays that result in
significantly increased costs to investors.175 A long waiting period for
businesses to get their LURs diminishes the desire of U.S. investors to invest
in Vietnam. This is true largely because it increases the transaction costs
investors suffer while waiting to commence business operations.176 In a
recent survey, seventy-four percent of all firms agreed that if land was easier
to obtain they would expand business operations. 177 The median time for
166
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obtaining an LUR was sixty days, significantly higher than the twenty-three
days outlined in the law.178 However, in some provinces it can take even
longer. In the Ha Tay Province, it has taken as long as ten years to obtain an
LUR.179
A 2003-04 survey on economic governance in seventeen provinces in
Vietnam found that of 488 firms surveyed concerning access to land, only
forty-four percent received their official LUR certificate;180 only 11.5
percent had completed the necessary formalities and were in the process of
receiving their certificates.181 All others were functioning without formal
title to their land by either sub-letting land from state owned enterprises,
renting from other private firms, or using informal title not sanctioned by the
provincial government.182
Due to the discretionary nature of LUR allotment, corruption
continues to be a problem in Vietnam’s government.183 According to a
survey by the ruling Communist Party, more than thirty-two percent of all
government officials would accept a bribe if offered one.184 The most
common reason for corruption is the desire to ‘speed up’ bureaucratic
delays.185 Corruption has a particularly negative effect on real estate
investors.
Among Vietnam’s most corrupt authorities is the land
administration agency.186 Thus, land transfer is particularly vulnerable to
corruption.187
Vietnam’s political structure allows local officials, or even local
agencies, to ignore their designated responsibilities in implementing laws.188
In addition, local tasks and assignment of responsibility and authority are
inaccurately defined, presenting an opportunity for corruption.189 For
example, officials have been known to issue decisions allocating lots to
themselves or to their relatives.190
Corruption is more prevalent because firms generally avoid
Vietnamese courts. The decisions of Vietnamese courts are “considered
178
179
180
181
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183
184
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arbitrary and enforcement mechanisms ineffective.’191 Instead of the courts,
foreign companies use the privileged access to Vietnam’s government
afforded them through their business associations and embassies to solve
disputes.192 Such access increases the opportunities for Vietnamese officials
to exploit the system by working on their own terms outside of the law.
Vietnam’s national government must promulgate laws that ensure that
“those breaking rules have less incentive to pay bribes.”193 One example of
such a law is the Civil Code amended in 2005, which requires all property
owners to register non-liquid assets.194 Prior to the new civil law, Vietnam
lacked property ownership laws, allowing unofficial transactions to control
the real estate market.195 This provided incentives for those desiring real
estate licenses to pay bribes. The recently amended Civil Code attempts to
counteract that trend.196
Vietnam’s government has “vowed to reduce corruption.”197 An
important first step was the law on corruption, approved late in 2005.198
This new law strengthens accountability by holding senior officials
“responsible for the prevention and control of corruption” occurring on their
watch.199 Civil servants and their immediate families may be monitored
under the law, as well.200 The law specifically targets increased public
disclosure and transparency in areas relevant to real estate investment, such
as “public procurement[,] construction activity, . . . [and] management and
use of land.”201
The lack of accountability in Vietnam’s licensing system has had a
negative effect on business. Title to land increases investment and access to
credit.202 Real estate investors who do not have a formal license to their land
are highly limited in their ability to access capital because they are unable to
use their present land as collateral to other business operations.203 This issue
191
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is exacerbated by local government failure to grant LUR “certificates unless
site clearance and infrastructure are complete.”204
U.S. investors believe that barriers persist which impede their
investment in Vietnam’s real estate.205 Vietnam’s weak transportation
infrastructure, issues with site clearance, and lack of national accountability
in the real estate licensing system may undermine U.S. investment potential
in the real estate sector.
IV.

VIETNAM CAN ALTER SOME POLICIES TO FACILITATE U.S. INVESTMENT

To facilitate U.S. investment in Vietnam’s real estate, Vietnam should
implement reforms to alleviate barriers identified by U.S. investors.
Suggested reforms include strengthening the transportation infrastructure,
decreasing financial risks and humanitarian issues stemming from site
clearance, and increasing accountability in its real estate licensing system.
Such reforms would address many of the concerns held by U.S. investors
and may encourage further investment in Vietnam’s real estate sector.
A.

Vietnam Should Reform Its Laws Affecting Implementation and
Funding of Transportation Infrastructure Projects

Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in regions ripe for tourism
development, should be strengthened to smooth the progress of U.S.
investment in Vietnam’s real estate. With physical barriers to travel
decreased, more tourists may venture into and around Vietnam and enjoy
tourism-friendly real estate.206 To facilitate such development, Vietnam
should strategically target infrastructure projects and reform its laws
affecting financing sources, including infrastructure bonds, privatization,
and local investment.
Infrastructure spending would most effectively enhance real estate
investment if used in regions strategically targeted for tourism
development.207 Successful real estate investment is closely tied to
successful infrastructure development.208
Strategically targeting
infrastructure improvement may further the success of infrastructure
204

Id.
While most investors are able to invest in Vietnam’s market without concern for real estate issues,
the very nature of a property developer’s investment is in real estate.
206
See Vietnam Still Unattractive to French Tourists, supra note 7.
207
See VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 139 (appropriate budget allocations
could be provided for provinces with stronger needs); id. at 149 (poorer provinces need more resources to
make investments in infrastructure and social services in order to attract foreign real estate investors).
208
Infra Part III.A.
205

876

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 3

projects. Thus, real estate investment would benefit from strategically
targeting infrastructure development.
To determine which regions should be strategically targeted for
tourism development, Vietnam should carry out feasibility studies.
Feasibility studies should address several issues which are key to successful
development. One such issue is whether tourism is likely to flourish in a
particular region if the infrastructure is strengthened. Sub-issues might
include how hospitable local residents might be towards tourists, the
availability of workers who are properly trained in hospitality, and the
region’s proximity to other points of interest. Another issue is whether
development in the particular region would be the most effective use of
investors’ capital. Such a determination should be based on factors such as
whether investors are likely to recoup their expenses by developing in the
region, and whether investors could, or perceive that they could, accomplish
the same for a greater profit elsewhere.
By strategically targeting infrastructure projects, Vietnam may be able
to substantially improve transportation in regions targeted for tourism
development. Strategically targeting improvements serves to concentrate the
scarce financial resources available for infrastructure development into
specific regions either identified as or targeted to become ripe for tourism
development. Thus concentrating financial resources reduces the risk of
spreading scarce infrastructure financing too thinly to allow substantial
improvements in any one region.
With concentrated infrastructure improvements, targeted regions may
be more attractive to real estate investors. With Vietnam pre-targeting
regions for development, investors may be less likely to face the initial
challenges or costs associated with implementing infrastructure development
on their own. Infrastructure development often must precede real estate
development. With strategically implemented infrastructure development, at
least some regions will have strong infrastructure. By concentrating
infrastructure development in targeted regions investors are likely to face
less infrastructure development responsibility than if development were
more widely and thinly spread.
In addition to merely targeting regions for tourism development,
Vietnam’s national government also should facilitate infrastructure
development by strategically implementing policies aimed at promoting
development. By implementing such policies, Vietnam may increase
development in certain regions. Such policies might include tax incentives,
reduction in the cost of LURs, and subsidies. As an example, Vietnam’s
Prime Minister recently designated the resort island Phu Quoc as a “special
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investment area.”209 Phu Quoc is considered to have great potential in
tourism,210 and Vietnam instigated the island’s special designation in “an
effort to spark development.”211 Investors in sectors including real estate,212
infrastructure, and tourist services will benefit from preferential investment
and land use policies.213
Reforming financing sources for infrastructure development may also
improve infrastructure development, and consequently may improve the
chances for U.S. real estate investment. The success of infrastructure
projects financed through bonds should be enhanced by improving project
evaluations.214 Attracting private participation in infrastructure development
is another way that Vietnam may increase infrastructure financing.
Reducing corruption in locally implemented projects is also important.
Improving bond project evaluations should enhance the success of
infrastructure projects financed through bonds.215 Improved evaluations
may allow common obstacles associated with infrastructure development,
such as clearing infrastructure sites216 and low traffic flow, to be identified
and avoided. It may also assist in identifying alternate locations for
infrastructure projects where such obstacles are less onerous.
Vietnam should also improve infrastructure financing through
attracting private participation. Private participation can be drawn to the
area through “promoting competition” within the private sector.217 This may
be achieved by implementing a transparent and honest bidding scheme. In
addition to promoting competition, Vietnam should improve investors’
confidence in the ability to recoup their expenses on infrastructure
investments.218 One way to increase investor confidence in the ability to
recoup expenditures may be to conduct project appraisals assessing the
traffic volume, and thus the likely profit, from transportation investment
projects. This is similar to the feasibility study.
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Reducing the risk of corruption in LDIFs is another issue that Vietnam
should address. One way that Vietnam may be able to reduce corruption is
to ensure that LDIFs are operated independently from the provincial
governments.219 Vietnam may also benefit from strengthening LDIF
regulations at the national level220 and improving the transparency of these
regulations.221
B.

Vietnam Should Conduct Strategic Site Clearance in Order to
Decrease the Excessive Financial Burdens and Humanitarian
Concerns Associated with Investors Conducting Site Clearance

Provinces should strategically implement site clearance and set aside
land designated for development in order to increase access to land for real
estate investors.222 Vietnam may be able to ameliorate some of the excessive
financial burdens and humanitarian issues associated with investors
conducting site clearance by conducting site clearance on its own prior to
luring investors. It currently takes an average of 231 days for an investor to
acquire land from the government.223 The length of this process is a result of
needing to clear the land of all current occupants and issue compensation to
resettle the current occupants.224 It is likely that this waiting period could be
drastically reduced if land were set aside and cleared by the government
ahead of time.225
To increase the effectiveness of government-conducted site clearance,
site clearance must be strategically implemented by Vietnam in areas likely
to attract investors.226 As with strategically targeting areas for infrastructure
development, Vietnam can determine which areas are likely to attract
investors by carrying out feasibility studies. Such studies should focus
heavily on the issue of whether tourism is likely to flourish in a particular
area. Thus, the sub-issues of how hospitable local residents might be
towards tourists, the availability of workers who are properly trained in
hospitality, and the area’s proximity to other points of interest should be
219
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examined. The study should also determine whether developing in the area
will maximize investors’ capital.
Humanitarian concerns may also be addressed by conducting strategic
site clearance. Vietnam is more attuned to the needs of its citizens than are
U.S. investors. Therefore, the concerns of Vietnam’s citizens will likely be
better addressed by their own government, rather than U.S. investors.
Vietnam may be able to work within its own country and with its own
citizens to identify regions ripe for tourism development which will have the
least negative impact on its citizens.
In instances where the government is unable to set aside and clear
land ahead of time, it should take a more involved role in site clearance to
ease the burden on investors and citizens. A recent example is the popular
foreign investment project in the Thu Thiem Peninsula where 10,000
households are expected to be displaced by development.227 To reduce the
burden on investors, the city government is expected to negotiate with the
inhabitants to acquire land for the project and has said it will directly issue
compensation to those households affected.228
C.

Vietnam Should Increase the Accountability of Real Estate Licensing
Authorities

Increasing the accountability of real estate licensing authorities may
improve U.S. investment in Vietnam’s real estate. In order to increase
accountability, Vietnam should shore up local support and implementation of
national real estate licensing policies. In addition, Vietnam should
implement and properly execute laws aimed at breaking down the rampant
corruption currently present in Vietnam’s real estate licensing system.
Vietnam should implement laws that encourage local governments to
support the real estate investment goals of the national government.229
Practical concerns require that local governments play a central role in the
actual implementation of the national government’s real estate licensing
policies. Thus, local governments are likely to retain a high degree of
discretion concerning to whom and how these licenses are distributed. The
challenge for the national government, therefore, is to encourage local
governments to use their discretion in ways that support the national
government’s goals.
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Vietnam’s national government should implement laws that will
encourage local governments to align their policies with the national goals.
The key is for the national government to implement policies that attract
local support, thus bringing local goals more in line with national goals. A
system of incentives to local governments could accomplish this. For
example, the national government could implement laws that reward local
authorities for furthering the goals of the national licensing scheme.230
Rewards might include providing subsidies to local public works projects
and promoting investment in the region.
Such a system of incentives may also persuade local public officials to
exercise their discretion in conformity with national goals. Through a
system of incentives, local public officials may be more likely to promote
national policy goals. Incentives could include promoting local officials
who succeeded in issuing licenses in a timely manner.231 An expedited
licensing process is likely to result, thus decreasing the burden of costly
delays that investors currently face.
Vietnam should also engage in reforms aimed at reducing corruption.
Reforms should focus primarily on local governments and local government
officials who are responsible for administering the real estate licensing
system at the local level. Additionally, while Vietnam is unlikely to make
significant reforms to its judicial system in the foreseeable future, judicial
officers who engage in corrupt activities should be influenced by anticorruption laws.
Vietnam’s current system should be reformed such that the cost to
local officials who engage in corrupt activities outweighs the benefit.
Increased costs should take the form of dependable sanctions. Sanctions
could include reduction in pay, demotion, fines, or imprisonment. To be
effective, these sanctions must be consistent and proportional to the corrupt
action.
While the imposition of sanctions is essential to an anti-corruption
strategy, additional methods are necessary to effectively reduce
corruption.232 To accomplish Vietnam’s goal of reducing government
corruption it is necessary to reduce the discretion of government officials.233
One way to decrease such discretion while minimizing invasive national
oversight would be to increase the role of fixed computer programs. 234
230
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232
233
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Fixed computer programs should be written by the national government and
then given to the local governments to use when assessing a license
application. If used properly, such a program may increase transparency and
ensure accountability, two important components of reducing corruption.235
While Vietnam has implemented a new anti-corruption law, its
efficacy depends on the way it will be implemented. The new law is more
comprehensive than typical anti-corruption legislation, which also leads to
“implementation challenges.”236
To resolve these implementation
challenges, conventional wisdom dictates that implementation should be
phased in. 237 For instance, asset declaration should be particularly focused
on the most corruption-prone agencies and senior officials first.238 This
strategy of “low coverage but close scrutiny”239 may decrease the risk of
overwhelming the inspector, thus diluting the law’s efficacy.240
V.

CONCLUSION

Vietnam’s investment environment has come a long way toward
attracting U.S. investors. With several additional reforms, U.S. investors
may find Vietnam’s real estate a particularly attractive investment.
Vietnam’s current investment market is generally attractive to U.S. investors,
with the overall economy experiencing significant growth. Vietnam’s
tourism industry is likewise growing. However, many U.S. investors believe
that barriers remain which impede investment in Vietnam’s real estate
market.
One barrier identified by U.S. investors is Vietnam’s weak
transportation infrastructure, which often makes travel difficult for tourists
hoping to enjoy Vietnam’s widespread attractions. Additionally, Vietnam’s
small land area and dense population create a lack of access to land, leading
investors to face the financial and humanitarian issues associated with site
clearance. Potential real estate investors believe that insufficient local
implementation of national goals and inherent corruption further undermine
real estate investment ventures.
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Vietnam has the opportunity to address U.S. investors’ concerns by
implementing reforms. Vietnam should create a financing scheme to
facilitate targeted infrastructure development. Difficulties associated with
site clearance may be diminished by Vietnam’s creation of designated
tourism zones. The lack of accountability created by the inefficient
delegation of responsibility and corruption in its licensing system should be
reduced through increased transparency and a system of rewards for
compliance. Implementation of these reforms may create a more appealing
environment for U.S. real estate investors.

